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REFLECTIONS ON 
PUBLIC INTEREST DIRECTORS 
Alfred F. Conard* 
I. THE IDEA 
The "public interest director" may not yet be an idea whose time 
has come, but it is an idea that can no longer be ignored. The time 
has come for responsible lawyers and other opinion leaders to know 
why, and to what extent, they favor or oppose it. 
The most noticed articulation of the idea is, no doubt, that of 
Ralph Nader and his associates. The Nader group would require 
that each director have responsibility for a particular area of concern, 
such as employee welfare, consumer protection, and environmental 
protection.1 Before the Nader manifesto appeared, Christopher 
Stone had advanced a more modest proposal whereby ten per cent 
of a company's directors would be designated to represent the public 
interest; in case of "demonstrated delinquency" in a particular area, 
such as consumer or environmental protection, a "special interest" 
director would be added for that area.2 Still earlier, Cyril Moscow 
had advocated that each registered corporation should have one "in-
dependent" director appointed by the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission. 3 All three proposals are directed to resolving the conflict 
between societal interests and corporate behavior that has troubled 
political and economic philosophers and has excited polemicists dur-
ing the past half century.4 
* Henry M. Butzel Professor of Law, The University of Michigan. A.B. 1932, 
Grinnell College; LL.B. 1936, University of Pennsylvania; J.S.D. 1942, Columbia 
University.-E<l. 
1. R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 12S 
(1976) [hereinafter cited as R. NADER]. A preliminary edition of the same work 
was published in 197S under the title, CoNSTITUTIONALIZING THE CoRPORATION: THE 
CASE FOR FEDERAL CHARTERING OF GIANT CORPORATIONS. 
The three interests mentioned here are by no means a complete list of those with 
which Nader and Christopher Stone are concerned. Nader also specifically lists 
shareholder rights, compliance with law, finances, purchasing and marketing, man-
agement efficiency, and planning and research. I refer only to employee, consumer, 
and environmental interests partly for brevity and partly because these are the inter-
ests which seem to be most prominent among the concerns of all three proponents 
of public-interest directors. 
2. C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SocIAL CoNTROL OF CoRPORATB 
BEHAVIOR 1S2-83 (197S). 
3. Moscow, The Independent Director, 28 Bus. LAw. 9, 11-12 (1972). 
4. For more general advocacy of representation of public interests without much 
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For a conservative or middle-of-the-road thinker, and even for 
a liberal who values his objectivity; it is tempting to reject public-
interest director proposals out of hand because of the intemperate 
denunciation of corporate management that accompanies some of 
them. 5 The rhetoric of Nader and Stone implies, although it may 
nowhere firmly assert, that corporate managers have been deliber-
ately ripping off the public in a mad chase for exorbitant profits. 0 
Careful observers are aware that many of the supposed sins against 
employees, consumers and the environment are, in fact, committed 
by enterprises that are clawing desperately for survival, managed by 
executives who would gladly accommodate public interest if they 
thought they could afford to. 
But one does not need to believe that corporate profits are 
exorbitant, nor that executives are monomaniacal profit-seekers, in 
order to recognize that a majority of Americans are dissatisfied with 
contemporary conditions of work, of consumption, and of living. 
Their dissatisfactions are expressed in a torrent of labor laws, con-
sumer product laws, and environmental laws. Since corporations 
provide most of the work, most of the consumer goods, and a good 
deal of the environmental deterioration, 7 they bear the brunt of regu-
specification of the structure, see R. DAHL, AFTER THE REVOLUTION? AUTHORITY 
IN A Goon Soc1ETI 115-40 (1970); Chayes, The Modern Corporation and the Rule 
of Law, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 25, 43-45 (E. Mason ed. 1960) 
[hereinafter cited as CORPORATION]. 
General critiques of this order of ideas may be found in N. JACOBY, CORPORATE 
POWER AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILllY, 120-245 (1973); Blumberg, Reflections 011 Pro-
posals for Corporate Reform Through Change in the Composition of the Board of 
Directors: "Special Interest" or "Public" Directors, 53 B.U.L. REV. 547 (1973); 
Ratner, The Government of Business Corporations: Critical Reflections 011 the Rule 
of "One Share, One Vote," 56 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 31-38 (1970). 
For a discussion of concern with corporate power and the interests which it 
serves, covering the last two centuries, see J. HURST, LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS 
CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1970 (1970). For a nine-
teenth century response to those concerns, see w. COOK, THE CORPORATION PROBLEM 
(1891). 
A general concern with the relation of corporate policies to societal objectives has 
been explored by Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Tmstees?, 45 HARV. 
L. REv. 1145 (1932); FUTURE OF THE CORPORATION (H. Kahn ed. 1973); A.S. 
MILLER, THE MODERN CORPORATE STATE: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS AND THE AMER· 
ICAN CONSTITUTION (1976). Polemic attacks on corporations' antisocial behavior in-
clude R. HEILBRONER, M. MINTZ, C. McCARTIIY, s. UNGER, K. VANDIVIER, s. FRIED-
MAN & J. BOYD, IN THE NAME OF PROFIT (1972), and I. WORMSER, FRANKENSTEIN, 
INC. (1931). 
5. See Jacoby, Federal Charters: A Flawed Case, Wall St. J., Jan. 10, 1977, at 
12, col. 6; Birdzell, Book Review, 32 Bus. LAw. 317 (1976). 
6. See R. NADER, supra note 1, at 15-74; C. STONE, supra note 2, at 1-110, In 
contrast, Moscow, supra note 3, at 9, recognizes the same problems in more measured 
terms. 
7. See P. BLUMBERG, THE MEGACORPORATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY: THE ScoPE 
OF CORPORATE POWER 16-37 (1975). 
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latory legislation. The defenders of the modern corporation as well 
as its enemies should, therefore, be concerned with finding better 
ways to reconcile the conflicts between corporate and societal objec-
tives. This essay explores one possible way. 
II. ALTERNATIVE ROADS TO THE MODIFICATION 
OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 
If corporate behavior is to be modified, there are more ways than 
one to go about it. The institution of public interest directors must 
be compared with other means of attaining the same ends. 
The most prevalent way of modifying corporate behavior for 
social ends is to legislate commands. The United States codes of 
laws and regulations are replete with rules on price practices, wage 
levels, safety devices, and emissions that exemplify this method. 8 
A second method of modifying corporate behavior is to 
strengthen the bargaining power of some of the people affected by 
its operations. The National Labor Relations Act9 is a conspicuous 
device for strengthening employees' bargaining power through 
unions.10 Another massive program for behavior modification 
through the exercise of bargaining power is the regime of securities 
regulation, which operates primarily by requiring disclosure of more 
information in order to protect investors.11 The voluminous rules 
on labeling foods and drugs12 and the requirement of list-price 
8. Familiar examples are the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970 & 
Supp. V 1975); the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 
13a, 13b, 21a (1970); the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-
219 (1970 & Supp. V 1975); the Walsh-Healey Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 35-45 (1970) 
(prevailing wages in U.S. procurement contracts); the Bacon-Davis Act, 40 U.S.C. 
§§ 276a to 276a-5 (1970) (prevailing wages in U.S. construction); the Safety Appli-
ance Acts, 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-43 (1970 & Supp. V 1975); the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1970); Air Pollution Control Act, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1857-1857(e) (1970 & Supp. V 1975); Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1165a, 1251-1376 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). 
9. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-188 (1970 & 
Supp. V 1975). 
10. For an analysis of the effects of union bargaining power on corporate pol-
icies, see Chamberlain, The Corporation and the Trade Union, in CORPORATION, 
supra note 4, at 122. 
11. Regulation is primarily through the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-
77aa (1970 & Supp. V 1975), and the Securities Ex.change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 78a-78kk (1970 & Supp. V 1975). The acts will be cited herein as the "Securites 
Act" and the "Exchange Act," respectively. 
See Levenson, The Role of the SEC as a Consumer Protection Agency, 27 Bus. 
LAw. 61 (1971); Butowsky, The Investment Company Act as "Consumer Legisla-
tion," 27 Bus. LAw. 71 (1971); LeBianc, Accounting as a Consumer Protector, 27 
Bus. LAw. 75 (1971); Sommer, Random Thoughts on Disclosure as "Consumer" Pro-
tection, 27 Bus. LAW. 85 (1971). 
12. Regulations for the enforcement of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic 
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tickets on new cars13 are further examples, adopted to increase the 
bargaining power of consumers. Unfortunately, no one has found 
a way to increase the bargaining power of the environment. 
These well-known methods of behavior modification may be 
characterized as "external." Less familiar to our thinking are the 
"internal" methods of behavior modification, which work by molding 
the values of corporate executives and directors.14 
One internal method of affecting corporate behavior is to make 
the managers responsible to holders of the interests that society 
wishes to protect. In the past, the only interests that society has so 
chosen to protect have been those of shareholders. Nearly all busi-
ness corporation laws give lip service to this objective by requiring 
that directors be elected by shareholders, 15 and the Exchange Act 
honors it by the elaborate pageantry of the proxy rules.16 Although 
these legislative designs can be easily nullified by resourceful coun-
sel, 17 they are often allowed to operate as intended, 18 and they create 
Act and the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act are found in 21 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-.700 
(1977); General Labeling Provisions (Drugs), 21 C.F.R. §§ 201.1-.19 (1977). 
13. Automobile Information Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1231-1233 (1970 & 
Supp. V 1975). 
14. Cf. R. DAHL, supra note 4, at 121. Dahl classifies controls as "internal" 
(through the corporate structure), "governmental" (through positive rules of be-
havior), and "economic" (through market mechanisms). 
15. iSee, e.g., ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 36 (1974); N.Y. Bus. CoRP, 
LAW § 703 (McKinney 1963). Under Delaware law, shareholders' power to elect 
directors is not expressly stated, but it is implied by DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 141(d), 
211 (b) (1974 & Supp. 1976). 
16. Regulation 14A: Solicitation of Proxies [under the Exchange Act], 17 C.F.R. 
§§ 240.14a-1 to .14a-12, 240.14a-101 to 14a-103 (1977). 
17. The shareholder voting requirement is most frequently nullified by restricting 
the vote to a very small fraction of the shares. In the Green Giant Company, be-
fore its notorious reorganization, there were 44 shares of voting stock and 428,998 
shares of nonvoting stock. See Honigman v. Green Giant Co., 309 F.2d 667, 669 
(8th Cir. 1962). In the Ford Motor Company, before the Ford Foundation's public 
sale of its shares, 88 per cent of the shares were nonvoting. J. LMNGSTON, THE 
AMERICAN STOCKHOLDER 147 (1963). 
The proxy information requirements are nullified, at least in the largest corpora-
tions, by the fact that corporate executives are allowed to use company funds for the 
solicitation of proxies which they will use to elect their own bosses. Insurgent share-
holders have no access to corporate funds for the all-important election of directors. 
See Eisenberg, Access to the Corporate Proxy Machinery, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1489 
(1970). 
For a general examination of the nonoperation of the "statutory norm" of corpo-
rate governance, see A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRivATE 
-PROPER1Y (1932); M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF nm CORPORATION: A LEGAL 
ANALYSIS (1976); Hetherington, Fact and Legal Theory: Shareholders, Managers 
and Social Responsibility, 21 STAN. L. REv. 248 (1969). 
18. See Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modern 
Corporate Decisionmaking, 51 CALIF. L. REv. 40-44 (1969). 
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an illusion of shareholder control even when they are functionally 
inoperative. The public-interest-director proposals are designed to 
harness this somewhat unreliable structure for the protection of inter-
ests of employees, consumers, environmentalists, and others. 
A second internal method of influencing corporate behavior is 
to indoctrinate corporate executives with a role conception that 
places a higher value on interests other than profit maximization. 
Most corporate decisions are irretrievably in the hands of the 
hierarchy of decisionmakers that John Kenneth Galbraith has 
dubbed "the technostructure."19 These decisionmakers may have 
already mingled the goal of profit maximization with goals of their 
own choosing, such as perpetuating and aggrandizing the enterprise 
and their respective departments within it. They could probably add 
a solicitude for the interests of employees, consumers, and the en-
vironment without even being detected. 
A socially oriented model of goals for enterprise managers was 
advocated in 1973 by a committee of the Confederation of British 
Industry, which declared: 
A company should behave like a good citizen in business. The 
law does not (and cannot) contain or prescribe the whole duty of a 
citizen. A good citizen takes account of the interests of others 
besides himself, and tries to exercise an informed and imaginative 
ethical judgment in deciding what he should and should not do. This, 
it is suggested, is how companies should seek to behave. 
Within its own field of knowledge, skill, geographical concern and 
financial capacity ( these are important limitations) a company has 
the duty to be responsive to the movement of informed public opinion 
as well as to the requirements of authority. A company should, as is 
indeed the practice of the best companies, pay proper regard to the 
environmental and social consequences of its business activities, and 
should not sacrifice the safety or efficiency of goods and services in 
the interests of expediency and competitiveness. In environmental 
matters, it is usually the company that is the first to know of a 
potential hazard or critical situation; it has a duty in such circum-
stances not only to take all possible remedial measures but also to 
inform the responsible authorities. 20 
In the United States, a leading academic analyst of business 
management has declared: 
In an economic world that lacks the automatic regulation which 
the classical economists' concept of perfect competition was supposed 
to provide, the business executive must try to reconcile a range of 
partially conflicting goals-those of his stockholders, his workers, 
19. J. GALBRAI'llI, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 79-83 (1967). 
20. CoMPANY AFFAIRS COMM., CoNFEDERATION OF BRITISH INDUSTRY, THE RE-
SPONSmILITIES OF THE BRmSH PUBLIC COMPANY 23 (1973). 
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his customers, his colleagues and himself, not to mention some vague 
conception of the public welfare as a whole. . . . In this welter of 
conflicting claims, it is not much exaggeration to say that the busi-
ness leader has to play at being God. 21 
Similar views have been expressed occasionally by United States 
business leaders, usually speaking in their individual capacities. 22 
Various devices may be used to intensify directors' concern with 
the public interest aspects of their enterprise. Proposals like Nader's 
and Stone's may be useful means of affecting directors' scales of 
values, even if they never have any impact on corporate structure. 
Sensitivity would also be heightened by a requirement, as proposed 
in France, that companies report on how they are satisfying the inter-
ests of employees, consumers, and the environmentalists (as well as 
financial interests).23 This would be quite different from the 
present SEC requirement, which compels disclosure only of effects 
of compliance with environmental rules upon the company's financial 
position. 24 The most effective sensitizer at the present time is the 
ever-impending threat of more rigorous regulation, which directors 
may seek to head off by responding to the demands of various 
sectors of the public. 
If society has a choice between modifying corporate behavior by 
external or by internal means, it ought surely to choose the latter. 
When pressures are purely external, corporate managers may be pre-
sumed to comply with them as grudgingly as possible. Beverage 
bottlers may obstruct throw-away prohibitions by lobbying against 
legislation, obtaining injunctions against its enforcement, repurchas-
ing containers at inconvenient times and places, and delaying or de-
ceiving inspectors. Manufacturers may comply with antinoise rules 
21. R. GORDON, BUSINESS LEADERSHIP IN 11:IE LARGE CoRPORATION xvi (rev. ed. 
1961). 
22. See R. BAUER, THE CoRPORATE SocIAL AUDIT iii, 3-8 (Social Science Fron-
tiers No. 5, 1972); D. MACNAUGHTON, MANAGING SocIAL RESPONSIVENESS (1975) 
(distributed by Prudential Insurance Company); BLUMBERG, supra note 7, at 4-6. 
23. See the proposal for an annual company report on a "social balance sheet" 
advanced in COMITE D'ETUDE POUR LA REFORME DE L'ENTREPRISE, LA REFORMS DB 
L'ENTERPRISE 204 (1975); Le "bi/an social" dans /es rapports des societes cotees pour 
1975, BULLETIN MENSUEL DE LA COMMISSION DES OPERATIONS DE BoURSE, December 
1976, at 7-8. 
24. "The amendments adopted herewith will require as a part of the description 
of an issuer's business, appropriate disclosure with respect to the material effects 
which compliance with environmental laws and regulations may have upon the capi-
tal expenditures, earnings and competitive position of the issuer and its subsidiaries." 
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10116 and SEC Securities Act Release No. 
5386 (April 20, 1973), 38 Fed. Reg. 12100, reprinted in [1974) 2 FED. SEC. L. REP, 
(CCH) ,r 23,507A (1974). 
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in ways that meet a statutory standard with the minimum permissible 
benefit to workers. 
Furthermore, external pressures imposed on resistant enterprises 
may result in deadlocks that can cause immense losses to everyone 
involved, as when wor~ers strike for higher wages or manufacturers 
strike (by refusing to produce conforming products) against emission 
standards. Such deadlocks may result from mistaken estimates by 
one side or the other about what is technically or economically 
feasible. Wage demands may push enterprises into bankruptcy in-
stead of raising incomes, and emissions regulations may close down 
paper mills and power plants, rather than achieving amelioration. 
If, on the other hand, boards of directors would be so constituted 
that they would spontaneously direct their efforts toward conferring 
the maximum feasible benefits on employees, consumers and the en-
vironment, accommodation of conflicting goals might be achieved 
after long study and debate, but without strikes, obstruction, deceit, 
and litigation. 
This is the dream of the advocates of public-interest directors. 
The question to be considered is, to what extent is it achievable? 
Ill. REDEFINING DIRECTORS' DUTIES 
If officers and directors are to give weight in their decisions to 
the interests of employees, consumers and the environment, an es-
sential preliminary task is to redefine their legal obligations. It 
would be a cruel hoax to appoint directors with a mandate to sacri-
fice shareholders' interests in favor of those of consumers, and then 
to hold them liable for damages because they have violated their duty 
to the corporation. But this could occur if public interest directors 
were appointed without changing the law of directors' duties. 
Unfortunately, the reformers' writings have given little attention to 
the solution of this problem. 25 
Since company managers have seldom admitted sacrificing share-
holders' interests to other considerations, courts have had little 
occasion to modify ancient dogma on this subject. The leading case 
is still that of Dodge v. Ford Motor Company,2& decided in 1919, 
in which Henry Ford was admonished by the Supreme Court of 
Michigan that his professed objectives of benefiting his employees 
and consumers were a misconception of his duties. 27 Although the 
25. The problem is explored in Rostow, To Whom and for What End ls Corpo-
rate Management Responsible?, in CORPORATION, supra note 4, at" 46. 
26. 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919). 
27. 204 Mich. at 507, 170 N.W. at 684. 
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court refrained from any fundamental interference with company 
policies, it did so only because the judges suspected (with good 
reason) that some long-term profit objectives lay behind the short-
term sacrifices. 28 Even so, the court ordered him to distribute $19 
million of excess cash. 29 
In later cases, judges have tolerated charitable gifts that were 
implausibly rationalized as furthering corporate interests, but they 
have not otherwise retreated from the doctrine that the duty of direc-
tors is to benefit the company investors. 3° Corporation laws have 
been amended to permit charitable gifts in limited amounts, but they 
still do not authorize charitable policies toward profitmaking. 81 If 
directors were chosen for the express purpose of representing other 
interests in corporate policies, they would find themselves caught in 
a very uncomfortable crossfire between their legal duty to the cor-
poration and the purpose of their election. 
A simplistic solution to the difficulty would be to declare that 
directors are bound to direct the company for the most desirable ac-
commodation of interests of investors, employees, consumers and the 
environment. To be fair, one should probably add some other inter-
ests not often mentioned by the reformers-those of creditors, 
vendors, immediate customers (who are generally different from the 
ultimate consumers),82 the national economy, and public order. 
The only known experience with such a multipurpose mandate 
is not illuminating. The German Corporation Law of 1937 com-
manded company officers to manage in the interests of the enter-
prise, the personnel, and the common wealth of the people and the 
state. 33 This formulation was dropped without explanation in the 
28. "We are not satisfied that the alleged motives of the directors, in so far as 
they are reflected in the conduct of the business, menace the interests of share-
holders." 204 Mich. at 508, 170 N.W. at 684. 
Ford's reductions in price and in dividends, which he attributed to altruistic rea-
sons, had the incidental effect of reducing the resources which his dividends provided 
to the Dodge Brothers, who had begun to compete with him, thus making competition 
more difficult. See L. SELTZER, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN AUTO-
MOBILE INDUSTRY 240 (1973). 
29. 204 Mich. at 487, 510, 170 N.W. at 677, 685. 
30. 39 CORNELL L.Q. 122 (1953). 
31. See ABA-ALI MoDEL Bus. CoRP. Acr § 4(m) (1974). For a tabulation of 
states with similar provisions, see 1 MODEL Bus. CORP. Ac:r ANN. § 1, ,m 3.01-.02 
(2d ed. 1971). A leading case under one such statute is A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Bar-
low, 13 N.J. 145, 98 A.2d 581 (1953). 
32. In basic industries like coal and steel, ultimate consumers such as railroad 
and automobile passengers are far removed from producers. Even in consumer goods 
industries, the consumers are usually separated from producers by one or two tiers 
of distributors. 
33. Law on Negotiable Share Companies (Gesetz uber Aktiengesellschaften und 
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law revision of 1965, which simply ordered managers to manage the 
company.34 
A dual statement of objectives is contained in the proposed stat-
ute for "European companies" to be chartered by the European 
Economic Community, which would command managers to "promote 
the interests of the company and its personnel."35 This dual for-
mula, like the simplistic solution proposed above, suggests some 
puzzling problems about enforcement. Could employees sue to en-
join the officers from unduly favoring the company over the person-
nel, while shareholders would sue for the reverse bias? If this were 
possible a whole series of management decisions might be thrust 
upon the judges. 
A possible solution to this difficulty is suggested by the proposal 
of the British Conservative government, made shortly before its dis-
placement by the Labour Party, that "companies should consider 
adding to their memoranda a clause allowing directors to take wider 
considerations into account."36 This kind of an authorization would 
permit managers to justify action that favored employees or consum-
ers, without creating a basis for complaint if they did not. The only 
misconduct that courts could redress would be directors' actions 
favoring the directors themselves or negligent actions favoring no 
one. 
A statute drafted along these lines would be a radical departure 
from current legal doctrine in the United States, but it would 
probably make little difference in the decisions of cases. Practically 
all the cases in which courts interfere with management decisions 
are those in which the managers have favored themselves or a con-
trolling group. The formulation would correspond to the public 
pronouncements of many corporate leaders, who proclaim their 
beneficence toward their employees and the public. 37 
Kommanditgesellschaften au/ Aktien) of Jan. 30, 1937, [19371 Reicbsgesetzblatt 
[RGBI] § 70,588 (Ger.). The closing words of the formula-Volk und Reich-
were bywords of the National Socialist movement. 
34. Law on Negotiable Share Companies (Aktiengesetz) of Sept. 6, 1965, Bun-
desgesetzblatt, Teil I, pt. 2 [BGB Ill]§§ 76(1), 93(1) (1965) (W. Ger.). 
35. Statute for European Companies (1975), art. 70(1), BULL. EUR. CoMM... 
(Supp. 4/75), at 41. The statute is designed to permit the formation of corporations 
within the European Economic Community which would be subject only to rules of 
the Community, rather than those of any one member state. See Vagts & Welde, 
The Societa Europaea: A Future Option to U.S. Corporations?, 29 Bus. LAw. 823 
(1974). 
36. DEPT. OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, COMPANY LAW REFORM 19-20 (1973) 
(emphasis added). The report ascribed the proposal to the "Watkinson Committee" 
report, but it is not clear that the report intended to be merely permissive about 
broader responsibilities. See COMPANY AFFAIRS CoMM., supra note 20, at 9. 
37. See R. BAUER, supra note 22; D. MACNAUGlITON, supra note 22. 
950 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 75:941 
IV. THE DIFFICULTIES OF MULTIPURPOSE MANAGEMENT 
To most executives, the vision of a board of directors composed 
of advocates of competing objectives would be a nightmare. Even 
when all the board members are devoted to the single object of maxi-
mizing corporate profits, there are problems enough in reaching 
prompt decisions and following consistent policies. The thought of 
directors with different and conflicting objectives evokes memories 
of the coalition governments of the German Weimar Republic and 
the French Third Republic. 
This nightmare might well become a reality if multipurpose 
directors attempted to follow the traditional statutory norm which 
states that "the business and affairs of a corporation shall be managed 
by a board of directors."38 But this precept has never been taken 
seriously. Corporations have often employed the statutory option of 
delegating many areas of decisionmaking to executive committees.80 
Even when they did not, the important decisions were usually made 
by executives and ritualistically ratified by the full board. 40 The pre-
cept itself has recently been modified by an amendment of the 
Model Business Corporation Act to provide that the business shall 
be managed "under the direction" of the board. 41 
The delegation of management functions to executives and 
executive committees may alleviate the problems of conflict in a mul-
tipurpose board, but probably would not eliminate the danger of 
destructive conflict, because the delegation would always be re-
vocable and subject to being overruled. A more complete system 
38. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 35 (1969) contained this formulation 
before its amendment in 1974 to prescribe management "under the direction of" the 
board. 'See ALI-ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT§ 35 (1974). Delaware General Cor-
poration Law was similar before it was amended in• the same year. See DEL. CODE 
tit. 8, § 141 (1974) (amended 1974). 
39. Statutory authorization for the delegation is found, for example, in DEL. 
CODE tit. 8, § 141(c) (Cum. Supp. 1976); ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRP. Acr § 
42 (1974). On the use of executive committees, see C. BROWN, PUTTING TIIE COR-
PORATE BOARD To Woruc 66-69 (1976); THE CONFERENCE BOARD, CORPORATE DI-
RECTORSHIP PRACTICES: MEMBERSHIP AND CoMMITTEES OF TIIE BOARD 50 (1973); 
THE CoNFERENCE BOARD, CORPORATE DIRECTORSHIP PRACTICES: ROLE, SELECTION 
AND LEGAL STATUS OF TIIE BOARD 109-17 (1973). 
40. See M. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY 11-13 (1972); R. GORDON, 
BUSINESS LEADERSHIP IN TIIE LARGE CORJ?ORATION 116-46 (1961). 
41. See note 38 supra. The Delaware amendments state that business shall be 
managed "by or under the direction of" the board. DEL. CoDE tit. 8, § 141(a) 
(Cum. Supp. 1976). For comment on the amendments, see MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT 
ANN. § 1, 142 (2d ed. 1971); Report of the Committee on Corporate Laws: Changes 
in the Model Business Corporation Act, 30 Bus. LAW. 501 (1975); Arsht & Black, 
Analysis of the 1974 Amendments to the Delaware Corporation Law, in 2 CORPORA-
TION (P-H) 375, 376 (1974). 
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for separating the function of management from the more delibera-
tive function of supervision is the European two-tier system, which 
divides corporate governance between a managing board of execu-
tives and a supervisory board of nonexecutives, including outsiders. 42 
The supervisory board appoints the members of the managing board 
but is forbidden to interfere in management functions. This system 
was adopted by Germany in 1937,43 by France (as an optional varia-
tion) in 1966,44 and by The Netherlands in 1971.45 It is currently 
contained in draft legislation of the European Economic Community 
which, if adopted, would be mandatory for all nine members of the 
community.46 Although observers differ on the merits of the two-
tier system,47 its growing list of adherents in Western Europe 
indicates that it has won widespread approval among those who have 
seen it in action. 
A simpler method of separating management from supervision 
has been suggested by Courtney Brown, who would merely remove 
all or most of the executives from the board. 48 But this proposal 
has the disadvantage of eliminating any requirement of group action 
at the executive level. Probably there is merit in the concept of 
shared executive responsibility,49 as embodied in both the traditional 
executive committees of American corporations and the "managing 
boards" of the European systems. 50 
If representatives of conflicting interests are to enter the govern-
ing structure of corporations, they should be restricted to supervisory 
boards from which management functions have been separated. The 
executives, constituting the executive committee or managing board, 
would be chosen to work together as a team in running the company. 
42. Vagts, The European !System, 27 Bus. LAW. 165 (1972); Schoenbaum & 
Lieser, Reform of the Structure of the American Corporation: The "Two-Tier' 
Board Model, 62 KY. L.J. 91 (1973). 
43. RGBl §§ 70-99, BGB III§§ 76-116. 
44. Law on Commercial Companies (Loi sur les societes commerciales) No. 66-
537 of July 24, 1966, arts. 118-150, in CCH, FRENCH LAW ON COMMERCIAL COM-
PANIES 72 (1971). 
45. Wetboek van Koophandel [W. v.K.] arts. 52c-52n (Neth.). 
46. COMMISSION OF TIIE EUROPEAN CoMMUNITIES, PROPOSAL FOR A FIFTH DIREC-
TIVE ON THE STRUCTURE OF SoCIETES ANONYMES, (BULL. EUR. COMM. (Supp. 10/ 
72) ). The directive would apply only to companies with freely negotiable shares, 
and not to "close corporations." 
41. See, e.g., Vagts, supra note 42; Schoenbaum & Lieser, supra note 42; Roth, 
Supervision of Corporate Management: The "Outside" Director and the German Ex-
perience, 51 N.C.L. REV. 1369 (1973). 
48. C. BROWN, supra note 39, at 32-33. 
49. See M. MACE, supra note 40, at 13-27. 
50. See R. GORDON, supra note 40, at 99-115. 
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The representatives of conflicting interests would debate and com-
promise their differences in the relative isolation of an audit commit-
tee, a supervisory board, or a board of nonexecutive directors. The 
omission of a provision for any such separation of functions appears 
to be a major flaw in the proposals of Nader and Stone. 
V. THE PROBLEMS OF MULTIPURPOSE SUPERVISION 
Even if the management function is separated from the board of 
directors, there remain problems in effective supervision by a board 
with diverse objectives. 51 To visualize the problem in its most acute 
form, one may imagine a public health representative on the board 
of a tobacco company, a wilderness representative on the board of 
a lumber company, and a zero-growth advocate on the board of 
a cement manufacturer. Although all these representatives have 
legitimate concerns, they cannot be effective on the board of a com-
pany whose whole program they oppose. To the extent that they 
are loyal to their own constituencies, they must favor the failure of 
the enterprise rather than its success. On the rare occasions where 
their interests coincide with those of other board members, their 
voices will be distrusted because of their known hostility to the 
objectives of the enterprise. 
Although this problem inheres in all board memberships for 
"public interest" purposes, its intensity varies greatly among the sev-
eral constituencies that board members may represent. It is least 
inherent in the representation of employees. In common with 
investors, customers and consumers, employees stand to gain from 
efficiency and economy in management, and they are uniquely 
situated to apprise investors of executive inefficiency and executive 
self-serving. In common with investors and with managers as well 
(although not with customers and consumers), employees have an 
interest in maximizing the prices obtained for products, not only for 
the present but also for the long-term future. Finally, in common 
with managers, they have an interest in the continuation of the enter-
prise, in contrast to speculative investors who may favor a stripping 
operation; giving employees a few seats on the board might be an 
effective way of dealing with corporate "raiders." 
This view of employee interests may appear inconsistent with the 
stance frequently taken by labor union leaders. But the apparent 
hostility of labor leaders to enterprise prosperity is partly, at least, 
a product of the warlike charade characteristic of the "collective bar-
51. See N. JACOBY, supra note 4, at 173-74. 
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gaining" process, in which workers must be constantly inspired with 
enough hostility to mount a strike in order to back up their bargain-
ing representatives. 
Employee representatives on a board might work very differ-
ently. As members of a board rather than bargaining agents, they 
would find that their success would depend on their ability to per-
suade the representatives of investors that their interests converge, 
instead of on their power to bring on a common disaster. Further-
more, each board would include representatives of the nonunionized 
employees as well as of the unionized; if the German pattern were 
followed, the white-collar employees would vote separately from the 
blue-collar. 52 In The Netherlands, the "employee representatives" 
are not elected directly by the employees but are co-opted by the 
existing board, subject to rejection by votes of employees. The 
German experience, covering a quarter of a century, indicates that 
employee representation can work for the prosperity of enterprise, 
or at least without adverse effect. 53 
There is, of course, one area in which employee interests are 
inherently contrary to those of other constituencies-not only inves-
tors, but also customers, consumers and others. Employees will want 
more pay, and representatives of other interests will want to give 
them less. But if employee representatives are less than a majority 
of the full board, representatives of other interests can be relied on 
to back up the managers' resistance to excessive labor demands. 
52. Codetermination Act (Mitbestimmungsgesetz) of May 4, 1976, [1976] Bun-
desgesetzblatt [BGBl] I § 10, 1153 (W. Ger.). Furthermore, the representatives must 
include representatives of white-collar employees and supervisory employees (fore-
men, managers and executives) as well as of blue-collar workers. 
The distinction between Arbeiter and Angestellten, which are rendered here as 
"white collar" and "blue collar'' employees, depends on a complex series of criteria 
set forth in the German social insurance law. A German commentator says it is 
chiefly a distinction between hand-workers and head-workers. H. MEILICKE & W. 
MEILICKE, KOMMENTAR ZUM MITBESTIMMUNGSGESETZ 1976, at 62 (1976) [herein-
after cited as MEILICKE]. 
In the enterprises which are still governed by the Enterprise Structure Law of 
1952, the classes of workers are not required to vote separately, but the law requires 
that the employee representatives include a white-collar worker. Enterprise Struc-
ture Act (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz) of Oct. 11, 1952, [1952] Bundesgesetzblatt 
[BGBl] I § 76(2), 681 (W. Ger.). 
53. Blumberg, Goldston & Gibson, Corporate Social Responsibility Panel: The 
Constituencies of the Corporation and the Role of the Institutional Investor, 28 Bus. 
LAW. 177 (1973); Simitis, Workers' Participation in the Enterprise-Transcending 
Company Law?, 38 MoD. L REV. 1, 9-10 (1975). 
A multipartite commission to study codetermination, appointed by the West Ger-
man Chancellor in 1966, reported in 1970. Their report, SACHVERSTANDIGENKOM-
MISSION, MITBESTIMMUNG IM UNTERNEHMEN (1970), contains a generally favorable 
account of the operations of codetermination. Id. at 54-98. The report is known as 
the "Biedenkopf Report," after its chairman. 
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The coincidence of employee interests with the interests of other 
enterprise constituents varies widely with the degree of employee 
dependence on the enterprise. In an enterprise that consists of a 
single retail store or restaurant, the individual salesman or waiter 
does not need to be greatly concerned with the survival of the enter-
prise; he can work as well for whoever absorbs the business after 
the enterprise fails. In contrast, the employees of General Motors 
in Flint or of U.S. Steel in Gary would face catastrophic dislocations 
if their employers collapsed. Among the factors that affect the de-
gree of dependence, one of the most easily identified is the size of 
the work force. There is therefore sense in the German rules that 
invoke representation .only in corporations with a work force of 500 
or more.64 
Another enterprise group whose interests are highly identified 
with the prosperity of the enterprise are the customers-those who 
buy its products or services. For a public utility-a railroad, an elec-
tric power company or a telephone company-the customers are also 
the consumers. Because of the monopolistic character of these indus-
tries, their customers are intimately concerned with the prosperity 
of the enterprise that serves them; the failure of Penn Central 
menaced its shippers much more than its investors, most of whom 
must have had well-diversified portfolios. Furthermore, the custom-
ers of a monopoly have very little ability to protect themselves 
through the exercise of bargaining power. 
The franchised distributors of automobiles bear a relation to 
automobile manufacturers somewhat like that of customers to a pub-
lic utility; they are deeply involved in the manufacturer's success, and 
their interests concur with those of investors and employees except 
in the price which they must pay for their purchases. Their repre-
sentatives might be expected to work effectively with investor 
representatives on a supervisory board. Like employees, they could 
probably contribute unique perspectives in considering how well the 
business is being run. 
Ultimate consumers are usually several steps lower on the scale 
of commonality of interests. The prosperity of any particular manu-
facturer is of little concern to them; their "customer loyalty" readily 
54. This threshold was set by the Enterprise Structure Law of Oct. 11, 1952, 
[1952] BGBl I 681. However, the provisions of this act were superseded as to enter-
prises with 2000 or more employees by the Codetermination Act of 1976, [1976] 
BGBl I 1153. As a result, West Germany has one regime of employee participation 
for enterprises with 500 to 2000 workers, and another more rigorous one for enter-
prises with 2000 or more. There is also a third regime for coal and steel enterprises, 
which is ignored, for simplicity, in this discussion. 
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gives way to offers of a larger rebate on a competing brand. The 
likelihood that their representatives will contribute much to the joint 
concerns of a multipurpose board of directors seems small. Even 
so, their chances of effective cooperation with investors are probably 
better than those of environmentalists. 
Still further removed from the interests of the enterprise are 
those persons concerned with the effect of the enterprise on the en-
vironment. The farmers who receive the fallout from Gary's blast 
furnaces and Butte's copper smelters may have no interest in the 
companies involved except to see them disappear. 
VI. THE SELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES 
Representation of the interests of employees, consumers and the 
environment is not likely to achieve much unless the employees, the 
consumers and the environmentalists actually believe that their inter-
ests are being effectively represented. If the representatives do not 
have the confidence of their constituents, they will, not have much 
influence on the representatives of other interests, and they will not 
allay the frustration felt by those sectors of the public. The constitu-
ents are unlikely to place that confidence in their representatives un-
less they have some role in electing them. 
Of all the public interest constituencies, the employees are the 
best equipped to choose their own representatives. Their names 
and addresses are accessible, and they have ready access to one 
another. The two principal dangers to be avoided would be domina-
tion of representatives by the company's executives and domination 
by labor union leaders. To guard against dominance by the execu-
tive, it would be sufficient to require the company to finance at a 
reasonable level the nomination and campaign activies of employee 
groups. To guard against dominance by labor leaders, it wou!d be 
sufficient to divide the employees for voting purposes into categories 
such as manual, clerical and 
1
supervisory, with each group having its 
own representatives, and to forbid the use of union funds in 
employee elections. 
Selection of representatives by customers would present a more 
varied set of problems. 55 It would be most practicable in power, 
gas and telephone companies, where the customers' names and ad-
dresses and volume of business are already known to the companies. 
In retail merchandising companies, on the other hand, voting by cus-
tomers would hardly be feasible, even if such a selection process 
55. See Ratner, supra note 4, at 32-33. 
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were not, as previously indicated, of doubtful value because of the 
lack of common interests between customers and other constitu-
encies. 
In contrast to employees and customers, ultimate consumers and 
environmentalists seem to be inherently unsuitable as electorates. 
Even the most outspoken advocates of their interests-such as Nader 
and Stone-have refrained from proposing that they be given a role 
in director selection. 
Recognizing the difficulties of using public interest constituencies 
as electorates, the principal advocates of public interest directors 
have proposed other methods of selection. Nader would have them 
elected by the shareholders;56 he would overcome their traditional 
passivity by various provisions for minority nomination and by requir-
ing institutional investors to pass voting powers through to their own 
shareholders. 57 This plan seems to be misguided in at least two re-
spects. First, it ignores the demonstrated fact that most investors 
will not take the time to study issues in corporate elections, even 
when they hold shares directly. When they have invested through 
institutions, they have already made up their minds to delegate their 
decisionmaking to others. Even if shareholders could be persuaded 
to participate, they would be more likely to demand higher dividends 
than to support social interests. Second, Nader ignores the fact that 
no one would have any reason to regard the shareholders' choices 
as reliable spokesmen for employees, consumers, or environmental-
ists. 
The Stone and Moscow plans are somewhat more plausible, in 
that both call for the major role in nomination to be played by inde-
pendent organizations, including governmental commissions. 58 Their 
proposals have the merit of assuring that the directors so chosen 
would be independent of the executives, but they give no assurance 
that these directors would be significantly closer to employees, 
consumers and environmentalists. Whether they would effectively 
serve public interests is an interesting speculation. Government 
representatives sit on the boards of many British and Italian corpora-
56. R. NADER, supra note 1, at 126-28. 
51. Id. at 126-30. 
58. Stone proposes that public interest directors be appointed by a new Federal 
Corporations Commission or, in its absence, by the SEC. C. STONE, supra note 2, 
at 159. Moscow leaves election to the shareholders, but limits the nominees to those 
approved by a new agency supervised by the SEC which would receive proposals 
from such national organizations as the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants, as well as bankers, lawyers, public accountants, university professors 
and others. Moscow, supra note 3, at 12. 
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tions and of the German Volkswagen corporation by reason of gov-
ernmental ownership of shares. One may reasonably expect that 
these directors, like ambassadors to foreign countries, would be 
obeisant to their appointing agencies and would confine themselves 
to repeating faithfully the pronouncements of their principals in the 
District of Columbia. As a result, they might represent very poorly 
the interests that they are designed to protect and would instead 
merely supply jobs for a new bureaucracy. The SEC's reluctant im-
plementation of the requirements of the Environmental Protection 
Act warn against relying on governmental appointees to achieve 
social objectives. 59 
Whether these untoward consequences would eventuate cannot 
be known without actual experience. Reasonable inferences could 
be drawn from observation of experience with government represen-
tatives on boards in European countries. There is also a small 
amount of experience available in the United States. Stone has 
analyzed, with inconclusive results, the experiment with a United 
States government director on the Union Pacific Railroad Com-
pany. 60 There have also been numerous government directors on 
the boards of companies whose shares were seized as enemy prop-
erty under the Trading with the Enemy Act, 61 but the present writer 
is not aware of any analysis of the roles that these directors played. 62 
vn. POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICABILITY 
In considering how various structural revisions of corporate 
governance might work in practice, I have passed over the question 
whether political and legal forces would permit or preclude their 
adoption in the United States. This question is left for another day, 
partly to spare time and space, and partly because I believe that all 
the ideas advanced in this essay will require long exposure to public 
discussion before they will be suitable subjects for legislation. 
For those who may wish to pursue further the development of 
these ideas, I will point to two areas of difficulty that seem to merit 
59. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. 689 
(D.D.C. 1974). 
60. C. SToNE, supra note 2, at 153-58. 
61. -See Fallon, Enemy Business Enterprises and the Alien Property Custodian, 
15 FORDHAM L. REv. 222 (1946), 16 FORDHAM L. REv. 55 (1947). 
62. The writer was briefly associated with the Office of General Counsel for the 
Alien Property Custodian (194571946), and is of the impression that government di-
rectors were principally concerned with assuring themselves that the companies were 
being run for the purpose of profit rather than for the furtherance of enemy political 
objectives. 
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particular attention-the political and the constitutional. On the 
political side, the main obstacle is the absence of any active desire 
for the implementation of these ideas on the part of the most eligible 
participants-employees and customers. With regard to employees, 
there seems to be a basic rivalry between the internal system of 
representation within the company structure and the system of collec-
tive bargaining. If internal representation should prove effective, 
union officers would lose their role of leaders-in-battle, on which 
much of their power and prestige depends. Consequently, union of-
ficers seem likely to oppose "codetermination," even if it would, in 
the opinion of impartial observers, serve the best interests of 
workers. Employees will be slow to perceive the conflict between 
their own interests and those of their elected leaders. 
With regard to customers, there does not seem to be any organ-
izational obstacle to representation, but simply a lack of any strong 
motivation to support it. The traditional defensive tactic of custom-
ers has been to seek legislative action; shippers have obtained rail-
road regulation, electric customers have obtained utility regulation, 
and automobile dealers have obtained a degree of regulation over 
manufacturers' treatment of distributors. Since the largest customers 
have customers of their own, their executives are likely to hesitate 
to espouse a principle that might undermine their own authority. 
Turning to the constitutional problem, an interesting question is 
presented regarding the constitutional basis for giving votes to new 
voices among the corporate constituencies. The proposal is reminis-
cent of the Dartmouth College case, 63 in which the State of New 
Hampshire attempted to place its own representatives on the board 
of overseers of the college. The particular constitutional objection 
that prevailed there-the prohibition on impairment of contracts64-
would not stand in the way of federal legislation, 65 but obstacles 
might be found in the .clauses on due process and on taking property 
without compensation. 66 Perhaps the state would have to compen-
sate shareholders for taking some part of their bundle of rights by 
taking away a part of the voting power in the corporation. A similar 
question was raised in Germany with the Codetermination Act of 
1976, and various opinions on it were expressed both before and 
63. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 
(1819). 
64. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
65. The impairment-of-contracts clause, U.S. CONST. art I, § 10, cl. 1, is a limita• 
tion on the states, but not on Congress. 
66. U.S. CoNST. amend. V. 
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after its enactment. 67 At this writing, the question has not been re-
solved by the West German Constitutional Court. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Putting together the pieces of the puzzle, we can draw some 
plausible conclusions about various kinds of public interest directors. 
Environmental interest directors are the least likely to be useful, 
even to environmentalists. Since defenders of the environment have 
few interests in common with representatives of investors, employ-
ees, customers, or consumers, they have little chance of making ef-
fective alliances with other constituencies. Having no constituency 
within the ambit of corporate operations, they have nothing to trade 
off. Although they might serve as gadflies, their energies would be 
more productively spent in the political arena, where their influence 
over voters gives them a position of greater strength. Their 
presence on corporate boards may even be detrimental to the en-
vironmental cause, for such presence might nourish the supposition 
that environmental interests are fairly weighed inside the corpora-
tion, which can never be true because of the weight of the interests 
arrayed against them. 
Consumer interest directors have a slightly better chance of oper-
ating effectively, because the other corporate constituencies-inves-
tors, employees, and customers-have a lively interest in consumer 
favor. But there are two obstacles for which no solutions have been 
suggested. One is the difficulty of finding the consumers and per-
suading them to concern themselves with their representation. The 
other is that if the consumers speak their minds, their minds may 
be devoid of any real concern for the prosperity and continuity of 
the enterprise. The mind of the consumer is usually on the market-
place where he pays the price for the product. Consumer interests 
are likely to be better served by improving their access to inf orma-
tion, suppressing restraints on competition, and invoking criminal 
laws against purveyors of dangerous or fraudulent products. 
On the other hand, customer-interest directors and employee-
interest directors seem to be structurally practicable. In the giant 
enterprises that are envisioned in all discussions of public interest 
directors, it will usually be possible to identify and mobilize the con-
stituencies involved. Both customers and employees have an inter-
61. See MEILICKE, supra note 52, at 44-47; T. RAISER, GRUNDGESETZ UND PARIT-
ATISCHE MITBESTIMMIUNG (1975); Meissel & Fogel, Co-Determination in Germany: 
Labor's Participation in Ma11ageme11t, 9 INTL. LAW. 190 (1975). 
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est in the long-term welfare of the enterprise even greater than that 
of many shareholders, who can switch their loyalties as fast as they 
can dial Merrill Lynch. Employees and customers are much less 
likely than investors to display the apathy toward corporate affairs 
that has turned shareholders' meetings into empty charades. 
The danger in a system of governance shared by the representa-
tives of employees, customers and investors is not so much that it 
would not work as that it would work too well. The normal impulse 
of investors to hold down wage costs and maximize sales might give 
way to conspiracies to provide higher wages, more restricted outlets, 
and higher profits, all at the expense of consumers. But this out-
come seems no more likely to take place when employees and cus-
tomers are represented in governance than when they are not. If 
employees and customers were represented, the former would have 
a chance to influence marketing in a direction that would maximize 
employment, and the latter would have an opportunity to influence 
wage policy in the direction of minimizing prices. The tendency of 
these constituencies to balance one another would depend in large 
part on the competitiveness of the industry. Representation of em-
ployees and customers might make rigorous competition even more 
essential to public welfare than it is today. 
The conclusions to which I am driven by these reflections may 
be disappointing, but they are not without their positive aspects. 
With respect to environmental interests, they reinforce the view of 
leading environmental spokesmen that their influence on enterprises 
must be exercised through the external pressures of regulations and 
law suits. 68 A secondary line of defense must be education of pub-
lic opinion to induce investors, employees, customers, and consumers 
to use their votes and their bargaining power on behalf of environ-
mental interests. 
Consumer interests are also unlikely to get much help from direct 
representation in the corporate structure. They must rely on a com-
bination of government regulation with the power of consumers to 
make choices in the open market. But consumers would probably 
get some indirect help from the representation of customers and em-
ployees. Customer representation will benefit consumers when it 
exerts its influence for a better product at a lower price. Employee 
representation will benefit consumers when it reduces the wasteful 
antagonism between employers and employees. 
68. J. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT 175-230 (1971); cf. Heyman, Quarles, 
Sive & Cutler, The Challenge of Environmental Controls, 28 Bus. LAW. 9 (1973), 
April-May 1977] Public Interest Directors 961 
Customers' interests, in contrast to consumers', could be effec-
tively advanced through changes in the corporate structure, and the 
consequences would probably be beneficial to ultimate consumers. 
Employees' interests could very readily be advanced through cor-
porate structure. Although use of this channel would probably not 
result in higher wages than they can get by collective bargaining, it 
might well operate to advance their welfare through more harmoni-
ous industrial relations. It could also benefit consumers and dimin-
ish the bitterness of the class struggle. 
If none of these forms of public interest representation are put 
into effect, it will not follow that the proposals have been in vain. 
Although their proponents have failed to modify corporation behav-
ior through structural change, they may modify it through the 
second "internal method"-the reshaping of officers' and directors' 
conceptions of their social roles. Probably all directors like to think 
of themselves, in some degree, as actors in the public interest, and 
the discussion of special directors for employees, consumers and en-
vironmentalists will make ordinary directors a little more cognizant 
and considerate of nonprofit objectives. 
More important than the effects of the public discussion of 
multiple societal objectives on directors will be its effects on the role 
conceptions of corporate executives. Regardless of who may be 
directors, enterprises are increasingly under the control of the techni-
cians who run them. This is partly because of the immense size of 
enterprises, but even more because of the technical character of the 
information on which decisions must be made. If public opinion 
calls for a greater sensitivity to community interests, and even more 
if it mumbles a threat to saddle executives with a new crew of mili-
tant public-interest overseers, executives will bring about decisions 
that tend to mollify the advocates of these public interests. 
